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Crémer and McLean [2] and McAfee and Reny [4] showed that, in
“nearly all auctions”, the seller can oﬀer a mechanism that obtains full
rent extraction. Later, Robert [8] showed that the result fails in the
presence of either limited liability or risk aversion. This paper provides
yet another reason. It shows that the full rent extraction result fails if the
seller is restricted to using auctions where the bidders’ payments to the
seller depend on the bids alone. Our interest for this problem is motivated
by the fact that both the “standard model of auction” ([3]) as well as the
most popular auctions display this feature. As a general matter, the proof
shows that full rent extraction results fail whenever the mechanism uses
only part of the information embodied in a player’s type.
JEL classification number: D44
Keywords: auctions, surplus
1 Introduction
Auctions occupy an important place within economic theory due not only to
the unquestionable importance of this procedure in economic life ([9], [7]), but
also because an auction mechanism can be considered an archetype of a general
mechanism design problem. In fact, problems like optimal taxation, regulation,
monopolistic price discrimination, trade under asymmetric information, public
good provision display, essentially, the same structure as an auction problem.
In a typical auction an individual, the seller, auctions oﬀ a single object
to N bidders. The seller maximizes his expected revenue from the auction by
designing a set of rules according to which the object is awarded to one of the
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and explanations. I also wish to thank the seminar participants at Columbia University and at
the SED 2002 conference held at NYU. Partial financial support through a Columbia Univer-
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bidders. Each bidder privately knows how much the good is worth to him.
Given such private information and the rules set by the seller, the strategic
problem bidders face is modeled as a game with incomplete information. Hence,
the seller’s problem can be viewed as that of choosing the game of incomplete
information that the bidders will play. An extensive literature (see [3] for a
survey) has studied how diﬀerent mechanisms perform from the viewpoint of
the seller (first-price, second-price, Dutch and English auction, etc.) as well as
conditions under which all these mechanisms give the same expected revenue.
It is clear that the presence of bidders’ private information (about their
own valuations, their beliefs about the opponents’ valuations, etc.) constitutes
the main hurdle the sellers faces in pursuing his objective. In fact, it seems
reasonable to conjecture that the bidders’ private information would lead them
to enjoy positive rents and, hence, limit the seller’s ability to maximize his
revenue. Yet, contrary to this intuition, work by Crémer and McLean [2] and
McAfee and Reny [4] has shown that — in “nearly all auctions” — the seller can
oﬀer a mechanism that obtains full rent extraction.
This begs an obvious question. Why we do not observe, in real-life auctions,
a widespread use of the Crémer and McLean mechanism? Or, as Jacques Crémer
once put it, “If I had to sell a good, I would not use one of this auctions. The
puzzle is to understand why”. Moreover, he went on by adding that “The
literature has often given as a reason the fact that if there is little correlation,
they could give rise to very high payments. This is not good enough. There are
a number of circumstances in which correlation is quite high, and we still see
some type of first price auction being used”.1
Of course, the full surplus extraction result obtains in a certain formal set-
ting. Consequently, one could seek an answer by questioning the ability of such
a setting to faithfully describe real-life auctions. This is McAfee and Reny’s take
on the problem. In [4] (p. 400), they conclude that “the result casts doubt on
the value of the current mechanism design paradigm as a model of institutional
design”.
Later, Robert [8] provided two other reasons for not using Crémer and
McLean auctions. This time remaining within the setting of the current mech-
anism design paradigm. They are the bidders’ limited liability and their risk-
aversion.
In this paper, we provide yet another reason. If the seller’s mechanism is
constrained to depend only on part of the information incorporated in a bidder’s
type, then generic full surplus extraction no longer holds.
There are at least two motivations for addressing this type of problem. The
first is that common auction procedures (first-price, second-price, Dutch and
English auction, etc.) are restricted mechanisms. That is, they use only part
of the information incorporated in the bidders’ types. This is so because the
bidders’ payments to the seller depend on the bids alone (they are “standard
auctions” in the terminology of McAfee and McMillan [3]). From this viewpoint,
this paper says not only that those procedures cannot obtain the full surplus
1Private communication.
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extraction (this is, of course, well-known) but also that no relatively simple
procedure, namely a standard auction, can obtain it. In fact, as we shall see,
full surplus extraction results critically hinge upon the bidders taking some other
action in addition to their bids, and on the payments to the seller to depend on
those as well.
The second motivation has to do with the observation that there might
be an inherent inability for the seller to fully describe a bidder’s type. For
instance, this might be due to the seller’s limited understanding of the various
dimensions of the bidders’ information or to the cost of gathering and processing
all the necessary information. In all such circumstances, the seller would oﬀer
a restricted mechanism in the sense explained above.
Recently, there has been much interest in “detail free” mechanisms (see
Bergemann and Morris [1]), that is mechanisms that do not depend on the
mechanism designer’s knowledge of the probability distribution, P , over the
bidders’ types. This is a broader problem with, of course, interesting impli-
cations for the full surplus extraction question. Relatively to this latter, this
paper should be viewed as complementing that line of research. The point, here,
is that the problem of full surplus extraction goes beyond whether or not the
mechanism designer knows P . If types are complex object — which they are if
we think of a type as a sequence of beliefs of all orders — and if contracts are
incomplete, in the sense that outcomes do not depend on all orders of beliefs,
then full surplus extraction may not be possible even if the Crémer and McLean
conditions are satisfied.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model used in
this paper. Modulo variations in the terminology, this is the same as in Crémer
and McLean. Section 3 reviews the mechanism of Crémer and McLean. There,
we put special emphasis on the two critical features of the mechanism. That
bidders are required to take some other actions in addition to making their bids
and that the payments made to the seller be a function of these actions as well.
In Section 4, we eliminate the latter possibility. We impose that, conforming to
the “standard model of auctions” (McAfee and McMillan [3]), the payments to
the seller depend on the bids alone. Our main result, established both in the
case of a finite set of valuations and in the case of a compact set of those, is that
there are open sets of auctions where the full extraction is not possible. Section
5 concludes. An Appendix contains all the proofs omitted in the main text.
2 The Model
In this section, we describe the model used in the paper. The description will
be quick as the model is the same as Crémer and McLean’s. The only diﬀerence
is that we phrase it within the framework of Mertens and Zamir [6]. This is its
proper milieu, and it will make the argument more transparent. Throughout
the paper, the number of bidders is finite. The set of bidders is denoted by I,
I = {1, 2, ...,N}. For simplicity, we deal with the independent private value
case, only. All the reasonings can be eﬀortlessly extended, but at the cost of
3
tedious qualifications, to the common value case or to any common-private value
mix. Since Crémer and McLean have remarked this in several occasions, there
is no reason for doing so here.
Each bidders i ∈ I has a valuation for the object v ∈ Vi, where Vi is a




is the basic domain of uncertainty for our problem. Ti denotes the set of types
for bidder i, and TN = ×
i
Ti. Recall ([6]) that a type can be identified to a
probability measure on V N × TN−1, and observe that, in our special case, any
of such measures must be the unit mass, δ(·), on that type’s valuation. Hence,
by means of the identification v 7−→ δ(v), the universal belief space generated
by V N is Ω = TN = ×Ti.
We restrict to problems that display a common prior P on T . Then, each
type ti ∈ Ti can be derived from P as a conditional probability. We do so since
the mechanism of Crémer and McLean is designed for these type of situations.
Following Crémer and McLean, we have
Definition 1 An information structure with basic domain of uncertainty V N
is a pair (TN , P ), where P is a probability measure on TN .2 The set of all
information structures with basic domain of uncertainty V N is the set of all
pairs (TN , P ) as P varies among all possible probability measures on TN . Such
a set is denoted by I(V N ).
For the sequel, it is useful to introduce an additional piece of notation. This
is contained in the next definition.
Definition 2 An information structure (TN , P ) ∈ I(V N ) is a finite informa-
tion structure if P has finite support in TN . The set of finite information
structures in I(V N ) is denoted by F(V N ).
Throughout the paper, the word generic refers to subsets of I(V N ), which
is endowed with the weak-* topology.
The next definition is slightly diﬀerent from Crémer and McLean’s. It is so,
because we need to distinguish between the case where payments depend on
bids alone from the case dealt with by Crémer and McLean, where no such a
restriction is imposed. For each i ∈ I, let Ai be a set, and let a ∈ A = ×iAi.
One can interpret Ai as the set of possible “messages” that player i might send
to the seller. Then,
Definition 3 An auction with message space A is a collection of mappings
{pi, xi}i∈I , with xi : A −→ R and pi : A −→ R such that pi(a) ≥ 0 for all i and
a ∈ A and
P
i∈I
pi(a) ≤ 1 for all a.
2Crémer and McLean call an information structure a triple (TN , P,wi), where wi is a
valuation function, i.e. a mapping Ti −→ Vi, which associate each type with his own valuation.
I deleted the reference to wi as a type’s valuation is immediately derived from that type on
the basis of the observation made in the previous paragraph.
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The interpretation is that if players “announce” a, then bidder i pays an
amount xi(a) to participate at the auction, and is awarded the object with
probability pi(a).




so to maximize his
expected revenue. Bidder i’s utility is given by vi(t)− xi(a(t)) if he is awarded
the object, and by −xi(a(t)) if he is not.
Crémer and McLean’s result (see below) can be rephrased by saying that
the seller can choose A = TN and mappings {pi, xi}i∈I so that full-surplus
extraction obtains.
As discussed in the Introduction, in Section 4 we study the problem of full
surplus extraction for a special class of auctions. These are called standard
auction ([3]), and are identified by the restriction that the bidders’ payments to
the seller depend on the bids alone. This is (up to inessential duplications of
the seller’s strategy space) a restriction on the nature of the message space that
the seller allows. Formally, let Bi be the set of possible bids for player i, and
let B = ×iBi. Then,
Definition 4 We say that payments depend on bids alone if A = B. In such a
case, we say that the auction is a “standard auction”.
3 The Mechanism of Crémer and McLean
In this section, we are going to quickly review the logic leading to the full surplus
extraction result. There are two reasons for doing so. One is, of course, to make
the paper as self-contained as possible. The other, more important, is that some
of the consideration of the present section will come handy when, in Section 4,
we study the problem for restricted mechanisms. Overall, this results in a more
economic presentation.
Recall that according to Definition 3, each bidder i has to choose an action in
a set Ai in order to participate at the auction. Then, the problem of full surplus
extraction can be described as that of satisfying the following two requirements.
For any i ∈ I: (1) Pick a set Ai, if any, so that the choice of bidder i reveal
his type; (2) Associate to each i’s bid and each chosen action a payment to the
seller so that bidder i’s expected payment equals his expected gain.
The idea of Crémer and McLean is to pick Ai equal to a subset of the set of
lotteries over the other bidders’ choices and bids. This is an especially virtuous
choice. It produces the feature that bidder i’s expected payment is linear in
bidder i’s probabilities over the other bidders’ types. It is, then, an easy matter
for Crémer and McLean to give conditions under which full surplus extraction
obtains.
Formally, the game with incomplete information chosen by the seller is as
follows. Each bidder i has to pick an element in a set Li, that is, one sets
Ai = Li. A typical element li ∈ Li is a mapping li : ×
j 6=i
(Lj ×Bj) −→ R,
specifying bidder i’s payment to the seller as a function of the other bidders’
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choices as well as their bids. Elements in Li are called lotteries as they are such
from the viewpoint of bidder i. The object is awarded to the highest bid (with
the addition of a tie-breaking rule, which is irrelevant for our purposes). These






→ R for each bidder i. A
strategy for bidder i is a mapping σi : Ti → ∆ (Li ×Bi).
Then, when TN is a finite set, we have
Theorem 5 [Crémer and McLean [2]] Generically (in the space of all the
P ’s on TN), the seller can choose the sets Li ’s so that there exists an equilibrium
of the corresponding game such that (I) Players play dominant strategies; (II)
Full surplus extraction obtains.
A similar result holds for the uncountable compact case (McAfee and Reny
[4]).
To see how full surplus extraction obtains, let us begin by observing that
since for each bidder the payment is determined by means of an li ∈ Li, bidder
i’s payment does not depend on his own bid. Hence, the rule that the object is
awarded to the highest bid implies that it is a dominant strategy for bidder i to
bid his own valuation.
Denote by tik a type for bidder i who has valuation v
i
k for the object, and by
gik the expected gain gross of the payment that type t
i
k obtains at this dominant-
strategy profile.
Under these circumstances, the seller’s problem is solved if, for each bidder
i, the seller can find a set of lotteries, Li, such that (at the above dominant
strategies) the following is true for each i’s type
E(lik | tik) = gik
E(liz | tik) > E(lik | tik), z 6= k (1)
In words, when oﬀered a choice among the lotteries in the set Li, type tik picks
lottery lik and his (total) expected gain is zero.
For simplicity, we illustrate the argument in the two-bidder case. Let T =
{t1, t2, ..., tm} be the set of bidder 1’s types, and let Θ = {θ1, θ2, ..., θm} be that
of player 2.3 In such a case, the common prior P is a matrix, P = (pij), on
T ×Θ. Denote by pk = P (· | tk) and qk = P (· | θk) the conditionals computed
from P (the types).
Now, suppose that bidder 2 is oﬀered a set of lotteries Λ = {λ1, ...,λm}, and




pk · l˜k = g1k k = 1, ...,m
pk · l˜j > g1k k 6= j
3To shorten the exposition, we have assumed that T and Θ have the same cardinality.
Obviously, the Crémer and McLean argument does not require such a condition.
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or,
pk · l˜k = g1k k = 1, ...,m
pj · l˜k > g1j k 6= j
Equivalently, we must find m linear functionals, {l1, ..., lm}, such that
pk · lk = 0 k = 1, ...,m
pj · lk > 0 k 6= j
In other words, the linear functional lk must separate pk and co {p1, ..., pk−1, pk+1, ...pm}
[co denotes the convex hull], and, for each k, we must find a linear functional
that does so.
It’s clear that we can fulfill such a request as long as
pk ∩ co {p1, ..., pk−1, pk+1, ...pm} = ∅, ∀k (2)
Let P1 be the matrix of conditional probabilities of bidder 1. Since (detP1 6= 0)
=⇒ condition (2), generically we can do so. Hence, given bidder 2’s choices,
{λ1, ...,λm}, and valuations, {v1, ..., vm}, we can use the components of the
vector lk to define a function
lk(λj , vj) 7−→ R
which is our desired lottery.
Finally, we can proceed in a similar way for bidder 2.
A few comments are in order. First, it is worth remarking that Crémer and
McLean constructively provide, in the way outlined above, a mechanism that
leads to the full surplus extraction. One of the mechanism’s virtues is that the
actual state of the world the bidders’ payment is contingent upon is verifiable
not only by the bidders and the seller but also by an outside observer. This
is so because the payment depends on the lotteries and the bids chosen by the
other bidders, both of which are observable, and not on the other bidders’ types
(which are unobservable). Second, the wording “extraction of the surplus in
dominant-strategy” used by Crémer and McLean is a bit misleading. In fact,
while it is true that it is a dominant strategy for bidder i to bid his own valuation
for the object, it also true that his strategy is more complex than just bidding.
Bidder i is, in addition, required to pick a lottery in Li. When both components
of bidder i’s strategy are taken into account, it is no longer true that full surplus
extraction obtains at a dominant-strategy profile. Finally, a consideration that
will come useful in the next section. The full surplus extraction result depends
in no way on the existence of a one-to-one relation between types and valuations.
To see this, just picture two diﬀerent types that have the same valuation for the
object. Since, by assumption, the two types are diﬀerent, so are the vectors of
conditional probabilities that describe them. This is the only consideration that
matters, as equation (2) makes it clear. As long as condition (2) is satisfied,
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full surplus extraction obtains. Put in a slightly diﬀerent way, assume that
condition (2) is satisfied. Even though the two types have the same valuation for
the object, they will choose diﬀerent lotteries because they have diﬀerent beliefs
about the other bidders’ types. Hence, the seller will be able to distinguish
between them.
4 The Case of Standard Auctions
Now, we are going to study what happens to the full surplus extraction result
when the seller is restricted to using standard auctions. These are a subset of
all possible auctions (Definitions 3 and 4), and are identified by the restriction
that the bidders’ payments to the seller depend on the bids alone. As the reader
certainly recalls, this is equivalent to say that (up to inessential duplications of
the seller’s strategy space4) the bidders’ message space coincides with space of
the bids. In terms of the type of mechanisms devised by Crémer and McLean,
this translates into a restriction on the domain of the lotteries. Elements in Li
are now mappings li : ×
j 6=i
Bj −→ R. With this exception, all the other ingredient
of the model are exactly as before. Our main result is the following.
Theorem 6 When the seller is restricted to standard auctions, full surplus ex-
traction is not a generic property in I(V N ).
Let us begin with a simple, but useful, observation. The necessary and
suﬃcient conditions to obtain full surplus extraction with a standard auction
are of the same type as in Crémer and McLean. The only diﬀerence is that
we have to consider the bidders’ first-order beliefs in the place the bidders’
types (the bidders’ beliefs over the other bidders’ types). To see this, begin by
observing that, just like in the previous section, bidder i’s payment does not
depend on his own bid. Once again, the rule that the object is awarded to
the highest bid implies that it is a dominant strategy for each bidder i to bid
his own valuation. Since his payment to the seller is going to depend on the
other players’ bids only, it follows that (at such a dominant-strategy profile) the
only beliefs that are relevant to determine player i’s expected payment are his
first-order beliefs, that is i’s beliefs on the other players’ valuations.
Now, we are going to split the argument into two parts. We will prove
the theorem first for the case of a finite set of possible valuations, which is
interesting in its own right. Then, we will extend the argument to the case of
an uncountable compact set of possible valuations.
4The seller can, in principle, still allow for any message space. If Ai is one such (arbitrary)
message space, the lotteries oﬀered to bidder i are, just like before, mappings li : ×
j 6=i
(Bj ×
Aj) −→ R. However, the requirement that the bidders’ payment depend on the bids alone
implies that the values of such mappings are univoquely determined by the first argument,
namely the bids. Hence, the use of the sets Ai’s is inessential, and they can be discarded
without loss.
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4.1 Finite Set of Valuations
Here, our strategy for proving Theorem 6 is to show that a standard auction
obtains full surplus extraction if and only if the information structure has a
certain special property. Namely, the support of the common prior is such that
there is a to a one-to-one relation between bidders’ types and valuations. Then,
we are going to show that the information structures with this property make
up a negligible set.
Throughout this subsection, V is a finite set, V = {v1, ..., vk}. To avoid
trivialities, we assume that k > 1. Also, recall that the space of possible types
for a player is identified to the space of probability distributions on V N ×TN−1.
Because of the nature of the argument, which involves (essentially) only
one bidder, two simplifying assumptions can be made for expositional purposes.
First, one can present the proof for the two-bidder case only. The argument
goes unchanged for the N -bidder case, but at the price of a more cumbersome
notation. Therefore, we are going to focus on a finite 2-bidder information
structure with common prior P , (Θ1 ×Θ2, P ). Here, Θ1 × Θ2 denotes the
support of P in Ω = T1 × T2, and Ω is the universal belief space. Second, one
can treat players symmetrically by assuming that Θ1 = Θ2 = Θ. For this is not
the case, it suﬃces, in all of the reasonings below, to consider the player with
the larger number of types.
Recall that since P is a common prior and T1 × T2 is constructed as a
projective limit ([6]), the beliefs of all orders of all players can be derived from
P . In other words, for any j we have a mapping P 7−→ P ji , which associates the
common prior with the beliefs of order j of player i. In particular, i’s first-order
beliefs, P 1i , are univoquely determined. In what follows, we write simply P
1 in
the place of P 1i since we refer to one bidder only. In the 2-bidder case, both the
common prior, P , and the first-order beliefs, P 1, are represented by means of a
matrix (indexed by Θ×Θ and by Θ× V , respectively).
As observed above, the necessary an suﬃcient conditions for a standard
auction to obtain full-surplus extraction are the same as in Crémer and McLean,
just with first-order beliefs in the place the full specification of the bidder’ beliefs.
It is worth to record this formally.
Lemma 7 Let ϕ ∈ F(V N ) be a finite information structure, and let m =
card(Θ). Let P 1 be the matrix of first-order beliefs. Then, there exists a stan-
dard auction which obtains full surplus extraction iﬀ no row in P 1 is a convex
combination of the other rows.
Obviously, this is the same argument that we saw for Crémer and McLean,
but now restricted to first-order beliefs. The proof is in the Appendix, and is
included only for completeness.
Given the content of the lemma, the next step is to inquire into the conditions
under which no row in P 1 is a convex combination of the other rows. To this
end, let us begin by observing that card(Θ) = m ≥ k. That is, the number
of types is at least as big as the number of valuations. This is obvious as each
valuation identifies at least one type. Hence, P 1 is an m × k matrix. From
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this, it is immediate to conclude that if m ≥ k + 2, then at least one row in
P 1 is a convex combination of the others, and the conditions for full surplus
extraction are not satisfied. In fact (see Appendix), such conditions are not
satisfied even in the case m = k + 1. Combining these observations we get to a
useful intermediate result (again, see the Appendix for details).
Proposition 8 Given a finite information structure ϕ ∈ F(V N ), there exists
a standard auction which obtains full surplus extraction if and only if both the
following conditions are satisfied:
(a) P has full rank
(b) v 6= v0 =⇒ θ 6= θ0
Once we have the proposition, it is an easy matter to complete the proof of
the theorem for the finite case.
Proof of Theorem 6 (finite case). The set F(V N ) of finite information
structures is the set of all pairs (Ω, P ), where Ω = TN is the universal space
of beliefs and P has finite support in Ω. Proposition 8 implies that the set of
all auctions for which there exists a standard auction which obtains full surplus
extraction can be identified to a subset of the probability distribution whose
support is a set of k×k points. Hence, it is a subset of a linear space of dimension
(k × k − 1), and is not dense in F(V N), which has infinite dimension. From
this, by observing that the set of probability distribution with finite support in
Ω is dense in the set of all probability distributions on Ω ([5]), we have that,
when we restrict to standard auctions, the full surplus extraction property in
not generic in I(V N ).
In fact, the argument just given proves a stronger result. This is contained
in the following corollary.
Corollary 9 Generically in I(V N ), standard auctions do not obtain full sur-
plus extraction.
Proof. It suﬃces to observe that a subspace of finite dimension h is closed
with empty interior in a space of dimension z > h.
The proof for the compact case is in the Appendix. It is worth pointing
out, however that the extension of our reasoning to the case of a compact set of
valuations does not respond to a mere technical need. In fact, the explanatory
power of the model with a finite set of valuations is severely limited by the
presumption that the seller as well as all the bidders have an exact knowledge
of set of possible valuations. As soon as one admits that such a knowledge might
not be exact, as it seems to be the case in most circumstances, one is naturally
led to considering models with an uncountable set of possible valuations. This
circumstance is clearly reflected by the widespread use of such a model in the
economic literature. The reader should consult [4] for a thorough discussion.
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5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have shown that the full surplus extraction result of Crémer
andMcLean fails when the seller is restricted to using standard auctions. Namely,
auctions where the bidders’ payments to the seller depend on the bids alone.
Our interest for this case was motivated by the observations that the “standard
model of auction” (McAfee and McMillan [3]) displays such a restriction and
that so do the most popular auctions.
The failure of the full surplus extraction result had already been established
in the case of limited liability and/or risk aversion [8]. Our result brings about
another reason for such a failure. Because of the nature of its proof, it can be
rephrased by saying that any mechanism that uses only part of the information
embodied in a player’s type does not obtain (generically) the full extraction of
the surplus. The point can be easily appreciated if one focuses on the fundamen-
tal nature of the problem studied. Namely, the asymmetry in the information of
the parties involved in an auction. By definition, a type of a player is everything
that is known to him which is not common knowledge among the participants
at the game. There are several reasons to think of this as a rather complicated
object, which other parties, like a seller in an auction, have just a limited un-
derstanding of. Formally, a type is an infinite hierarchy of beliefs, and a limited
description would correspond to truncated hierarchy. Then, our result says that
in all such circumstances, the full surplus extraction result fails.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 7. Denote by pj the j-th row of P 1, j = 1, 2, ...,m. The
k-component vector pj is a probability distribution on V = {v1, ..., vk}.
As explained in the above, in order to show that full surplus extraction
obtains we need to show that there exist m linear functionals — l˜1, l˜2, ..., l˜m —
such that
pj l˜j = E(u | θj) (3)
pj l˜k > E(u | θj) , k 6= j
or equivalently that there exist m linear functionals — l1, l2, ..., lm — such that
pjlj = 0 (4)
pklj > 0 , k 6= j
Just like before, m linear functional, l1, l2, ..., lm, with the desired properties
exist if and only if
pj ∩ co {p1, ..., pj−1, pj+1, ..., pm} = ∅ , j = 1, ...,m (5)
In fact, if condition (5) is satisfied for pj , then the desired linear functional
lj exists by any elementary separation theorem. The converse (necessity) is
obvious.
Proof of Proposition 8
Recall that the common prior P = (pij) is a matrix on Θ×Θ. The element
pij gives the probability that bidder 1 is of type θi and bidder 2 is of type θj .
Recall also that a type is a conditional probability on V 2 × Θ, and that his
first order belief is a probability on V , computed as a marginal from his type.
Therefore, bidder 1’s first-order beliefs give the probability that bidder 2 has
valuation vj given that bidder 1 is of type θi. Denote by 1vl the map on Θ that
takes value 1 if type θ has valuation vl, and 0 otherwise. Clearly, player 1’s first-
order beliefs (the elements of the matrix P 1) are computed from P according
to the formula








Let {Jl}k1 be a partition of the set of types, Θ, so that two types, θ and θ0, are in
the same class if they have the same valuation (v = v0 = vl, for some l). Then,
Lemma 10 A row in P 1 is a convex combination of the other rows if ∃λ ∈ Rm,







 = 0 , l = 1, ..., k
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where cj is the j-th column in P (the common prior).




















Conversely, if ∃λ satisfying (7), then the n-th row in P 1 is a convex combi-
nation of the other rows.
Proof. We saw that a generic element, p1il, in P
















Suppose that row n in P 1 is a convex combination of the other rows. This means














jz , z = 1, ..., k
















, z = 1, ..., k
To ease the notation, denote by p·j the sum of the elements of the j-th row in
P , and set pn,Jz =
P
j∈Jz









, z = 1, ..., k























The converse is obvious.
The proof of Proposition 8 rests on the following simple
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Lemma 11 Let d1, ..., dk ∈ Rm, k < m. Then, ∃λ ∈ Rm, λ 6= 0, such that
λdl = 0 , l = 1, ..., k
Moreover, either λ is proportional to an element of the canonical basis of Rm












Proof. Let d1, ..., dk ∈ Rm. By the dimension theorem and the orthogonal
decomposition of Euclidean spaces, k < m implies ∃λ ∈ Rm, λ 6= 0, such that
λdl = 0, l = 1, ..., k.
First, suppose that djl 6= 0, j = 1, ...,m and l = 1, ..., k. Let {αj}mj=1 be a
set of numbers such that
mP
j=1
αj = 0. Then, clearly the vector





solves the l-th equation, l = 1, ..., k.
Now, define a vector λ ∈ Rm by



































































If djl = 0 for some j and l, then it is clear — by repeating the same reasoning
or by simple geometric inspection — that a λ of the same form exists as long as
k < m− 1 or at least one of the d1, ..., dk has at least two components diﬀerent
from zero (this is obtained by simply setting in the above reasoning αj = 0
when djl = 0).
The only case where the above reasoning does not apply is when k = m− 1
and each dj is proportional to a vector of the canonical basis of Rm. In such a
case, our λ must be itself proportional to a vector of the canonical basis of Rm.
Proof of Proposition 8. Let card(Θ) = m. The matrix P 1 of a bidder’s
first-order beliefs is an m× k matrix. Hence, its k columns are vectors in Rm.
Let m > k. Then, it cannot be that all the vectors are vectors of the canonical
basis in Rm (this would imply that at least one row in the m×m matrix P is
0, contradicting supp(P ) = Θ×Θ). Hence, by Lemmata 11 and 10, ∃λ ∈ Rm,











= 0, l = 1, ..., k. Hence, at least one
row in P 1 is a convex combination of the others, and by Lemma 7 full surplus
extraction does not obtain.
It follows that a necessary condition for full surplus extraction is m = k,
that is diﬀerent valuations are associated to diﬀerent types5. In such a case, P 1
is a k × k matrix, and by Lemma 7 a necessary and suﬃcient condition for full
surplus extraction is that P 1 has full rank. In turn, this is the case if and only
if the common prior P is itself a k × k matrix with full rank.
Proof of Theorem 6 (compact case). Suppose that generically in
I(V N ) there exists a standard auction which obtains full surplus extraction
(FSE). It follows at once from this assumption that there exists one information
structure (Ω, P ∗) such that P ∗ has full support and FSE obtains.
The set {(Ω, P ) | P has finite support} is dense in I(V N ). Hence, there is a
sequence {(Ω, Pj)}∞0 such that
(i) (Ω, Pj) −→ (Ω, P ∗)
(ii) for any integer j, Pj has finite support.
The assumption of genericity of FSE implies that we can construct the se-
quence {(Ω, Pj)}∞0 so that FSE obtains for (Ω, Pj), for any integer j. Moreover,
without loss, we can assume that, along {(Ω, Pj)}∞0 , Supp(Pj) ⊆ Supp(Pj+1)
for each j [we can obtain this by simply constructing a new sequence with the
desired property from {(Ω, Pj)}∞0 ].





of first-order beliefs of player i, i = 1, ..., N .
By construction, FSE obtains on {(Ω, Pj)}∞0 , ∀j. From the proof for the
finite case, we know that for this to be true it must be true that for each j there
5Recall that one of the requirements in the construction of the type space is that a type
knows his own valuation.
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is a bijection
bj : Vj −→ Tj
where Vj is a finite subset of V and Tj is a finite subset of T (the set of types
for player i) [From the proof for the finite case, we know that for finite subsets
of valuations, FSE obtains iﬀ the mapping from valuations to first-order beliefs
is a bijection. Then, with each first-order belief associate that type with that
first order belief]. Recall that the consistency condition that a type knows his
own valuation implies valuation v is associated to a type who has valuation v
bj(v) = tv (9)
Now, each bj satisfies (9), and since Tj ⊆ Tj+1 and bj is a bijection
bj ≤ bj+1
in the ordering of partial functions.
Let B be the set of partial functions defined on closed subsets of V which
satisfy property (9). By Zorn’s Lemma, B has a maximal element.
As (Ω, Pj) −→ (Ω, P ∗), Tj −→ T and, along such a sequence, bj can be
extended to a maximal element in B, which has necessarily V as domain.
Summarizing, along the sequence (Ω, Pj) −→ (Ω, P ∗) we can construct a
bijection b : V −→ T which satisfies property (9).
Because of property (9) and the construction of Ω, such a b is defined by





where i is the canonical injection. Hence, b can be taken to be continuous.











where ∼ denotes a homeomorphism. It follows that the mapping T −→ V
constructed on the right hand part of the diagram is the inverse of b, and it is
continuous.
Therefore, along the sequence (Ω, Pj) −→ (Ω, P ∗), the mapping b : V −→ T
can be taken to be a homeomorphism.
But, Ω is V N -based. Hence, T can be taken to be Π(V N ×TN−1), the set of
probability measures on V N ×TN−1, and our construction implies that there is
a homeomorphism V ∼ Π(V N × TN−1). Such a homeomorphism requires both
V and T to be one-point spaces, contrary to our hypothesis.
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